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In brief, the binding problem is the 
question of how it is that the brain puts 
all the various simple features of objects 
from the multiple senses together to  
(a) create a perception of coherent 
objects that are distinct from others, 
and then (b) to put all these coherent 
objects into a conscious scene where 
everything is unified in conscious 
perception. A major researcher in the 
area, Anne Treisman, makes the fol-
lowing statement on the problem:
The binding problem in percep-
tion deals with … how we achieve 
the experience of a coherent 
world of integrated objects, and 
avoid seeing a world of disem-
bodied or wrongly combined 
shapes, colours, motions, sizes, and 
distances … how do we specify 
what goes with what? (from 
Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society of London, 1988)
Thus, the binding problem is pretty 
important. Without such binding, I 
wouldn’t be writing this, as our species 
would not have survived very long 
or evolved in the first place. This is 
because without such binding, con-
sciousness from moment to moment 
would be a chaotic jumble of sensory 
and perceptual features in an incom-
prehensible collage of overlapping 
and incoherent conscious experience. 
Figures one and two are attempts by 
the author to illustrate this, though 
in simplified form. Figure one repre-
sents a picture of a cat correctly bound 
together. Figure two is a rough idea 
of what the image might look like if 
perceptual binding was not working 
correctly in some fashion.
Moreover, it is not restricted to exter-
nal stimuli. When we remember 
something, say the last lunch date we 
had, various features of that memory 
are stored all over the brain in various 
areas. Somehow, they must all come 
together into a coherent subjective 
experience. Some think of memory as 
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“We must not be too sure of the ignorance of our ancestors”
– Will Durant
When I was in graduate school in the mid-1990s, one of my main interests was consciousness. What exactly was it? How 
did it work? How exactly did a three-pound piece 
of meat in my head produce a person with internal, 
qualitative, subjective states with a unified perceptual 
and overall mental experience? This part about unified 
mental experience is referred to as neural binding, and, 
since we don’t really know exactly how it works, it is 
called the binding problem.
Figure 1: (Author’s Photo) Figure 2: (Author’s Photo)
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a filing cabinet, where memories get 
filed away, they get stored, and when 
you want them you open up the correct 
file and there is your memory just the 
way things happened. Unfortunately,  
a better analogy would be that memory 
is like a jigsaw puzzle made of mil-
lions of pieces all scattered about a large 
number of neural connections that 
one has to put together in real time, 
moment to moment, with no picture 
on the box to go by. Even our train of 
thought, and whatever comes to mind 
during it, must be bound together. 
Whenever I am reminded of this, I 
am continually amazed that the whole 
system works at all.
During graduate school I came across 
a series of papers by Francis Crick and 
Christof Koch on feature binding in 
the visual cortex. Francis Crick is the 
Crick from Crick and Watson that 
won the Nobel Prize in 1962 for their 
work on the helical structure of DNA. 
Crick apparently had a seriously f lexible 
mind, allowing him to switch from 
expertise in genetics to expertise in 
neuroscience. At any rate, these papers 
attracted significant attention as they 
proposed a measurable mechanism for 
feature binding in the visual cortex – 
that is, how we put together various 
simple features of visual stimuli to build 
up a conscious experience of something 
far more complex, like seeing a person 
or an object. Earlier work had certainly 
been done decades before, but these 
papers still stand as a landmark con-
cerning the binding problem. In short, 
it was proposed that neurons across  
different areas fire in synchronous pat-
terns or wavelengths to bind visual  
contents together. It is an idea akin to 
an orchestra with all the separate instru-
ments playing a coherent song, but  
with no conductor. Much work has 
been done since then. Binding is vital 
to our psychological functioning and it 
is still a very hot topic in neuroscience 
and a variety of other areas – so much 
so that some may think that it is a new 
topic, a recent advance, something that 
was not much considered before. This  
is inaccurate and, also, where things  
get interesting.
Some Remarkably  
Early History
The general idea behind the binding 
problem, the unity of conscious experi-
ence, is far from a new question. One 
famous person to consider is Descartes 
in the 1600s. Descartes had ideas about 
how it all comes together for us, as if 
there were some little ‘me’ inside our 
mind watching experience on a movie 
screen in an area of the brain called 
the pineal gland. This setup is referred 
to as the Cartesian Theater. It is quite 
famous for being very intuitive, as well 
as for arriving at the beginnings of a 
more modern age that was ready to 
receive Descartes’ thoughts and build 
upon his ideas. However, it is also quite 
impossible, partly due to ignoring the 
mind-body problem, but partly too in 
terms of infinite regress with the little 
‘me’ – who’s watching the movie in 
their head, and so on to infinity? 
Despite such difficulties, and the fact 
that it is a popular place to start philo-
sophical discussions on the unity of 
conscious experience, Descartes is a 
path too well trodden by those who 
study philosophy of mind. When one 
looks back further, issues surrounding 
the unity of conscious experience crop 
up again and again, and down though 
history for a long, long time. Therefore, 
I’d like to share some thoughts on the 
binding problem from three periods 
in history more than 1600 years before 
Descartes, to explore some hopefully 
less familiar territory. 
Two words of warning, however. First, 
when going back into time this deeply, 
sometimes all we have are fragments 
of sayings, or comments by others on 
the original sayings. In a sense, some-
times it is akin to reconstructing a 
whole dinosaur from a tooth and two 
leg bones. Second, even experts in the 
field continue to be perplexed by some 
early philosophical sayings. Indeed, the 
Presocratic philosopher Heraclitus was 
referred to as ‘the obscure’ even in his 
own time – what is one to make of this 
Alcmaeon proposed that a 
primary distinction between 
animals and humans was that 
animals have sense perception, but 
only humans have understanding. 
… This has led some scholars to 
propose that Alcmaeon was saying 
that humans can bring together 
the various senses in a way that 
animals cannot. 
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millennia later? So, just a quick caution, 
there is some wiggle room concerning 
what exactly these folks were talking 
about, particularly the further back one 
digs into their writings and systems. 
Nonetheless, though the choices I’ve 
made may perhaps be obscure or even 
incommensurable in their details and 
connections within entire philosophi-
cal systems, the selections I’ve made 
are very clear examples concerning the 
binding problem. 
Stoicism
The relevant Stoic thinkers lived during 
a period in time roughly 300 to 100 
B.C.E. I will not go into the over-
all system of Stoics nor the folks that 
follow. Rather, I will try to remain 
restrained to what is directly important 
to the binding problem. Nonetheless, 
some background may be required to 
provide context – when this is needed,  
I will try to be brief!
The key to the Stoic world view was 
their theory of pneuma. Pneuma 
is tough to wrap one’s much more 
modern brain around, but the term 
originally meant ‘breath,’ and a kind 
of vital force that allowed for life and 
psychological functioning. I might 
refer to it as more of a pseudo-physical-
immaterial breath-like f luid-like thing 
(I realize that’s a bit vague). At any rate, 
pneuma was a single theoretical entity 
which the Stoics used to explain the 
functioning of everything from rocks 
to the soul or mind (the current distinc-
tion between the soul and the mind  
had not quite fully arrived on the scene 
yet). In essence, there was a continuum 
of pneuma tension corresponding to  
a continuum of degree of unified  
functioning. The lowest degree of  
tension simply referred to holding 
things together, like rocks. A cou-
ple levels up was for the soul, which 
provided for perception and action, 
such as in animals, and the final level 
served for intelligence, understand-
ing, and rational thought in humans. 
Interestingly, this is actually the bind-
ing problem right here, in terms of the 
degree of pneuma tension, but more for 
physical and mental things overall than 
just for psychological functioning.
In discussing the human soul or mind, 
they referred to it, or sometimes a 
part of it, as the h-egemonikon or the 
‘governing part.’ The h-egemonikon 
was thought to be a centralized com-
munication mechanism that received 
information from all parts of the organ-
ism, made sense of it, and provided for 
coherent psychological functioning 
and understanding. Here is where the 
binding problem comes into play. The 
Stoics claimed that it spoke a language 
common to all the senses, and that 
it was involved in all mental events. 
In essence, it allowed for sensory and 
psychological integration and organi-
zation, a requirement for reason and 
understanding. This ability is at the 
heart of mental binding.
Aristotle
Aristotle (roughly 382-322 B.C.E.) dis-
cussed across several works how, at least 
in part, the unity of the soul or mind 
was achieved. In short, for Aristotle 
there was apparently a ‘common sense’ 
or single sense where perceptions all 
came together. Two quotes from two 
works of Aristotle are of note here:
But the various senses inciden-
tally perceive each other’s proper 
objects, not as so many separate 
senses, but as forming a single 
sense... (from De Anima)
Now every sense has both a special 
function of its own ... but there is  
also a common faculty associated 
with them all, whereby one is 
conscious [the word conscious is 
probably a somewhat anachronistic 
translation for the original termi-
nology] that one sees and hears 
… for it is not by sight that one is 
aware that one sees; and one judges 
and is capable of judging that sweet 
is different from white not by taste, 
nor by sight, nor by a combination 
of the two, but by some part which 
is common to all the sense organs 
... (from Parva Naturalia)
… memory is like a jigsaw puzzle 
made of millions of pieces all 
scattered about a large number  
of neural connections that one 
has to put together in real time 
moment to moment with no 
picture on the box to go by. 
Even our train of thought, and 
whatever comes to mind during 
it, must be bound together. 
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Thus, the common sense allowed for 
judgments between the senses, neces-
sarily bringing them together in some 
way to help provide a unified psycho-
logical experience. Again, this is the 
binding problem.
The Presocratics
The time of the Presocratics started 
with Thales (roughly 636-546 B.C.E.) 
and ended around the time of Socrates 
and Plato about three hundred years 
later. During this time period, two peo-
ple are particularly worth mentioning.
The first is Alcmaeon (roughly 510-
440 B.C.E.), one of the first physicians 
on record to have moved away from 
archaic, mystical, or religious medi-
cal thought toward more biogenic and 
naturalistic ideas about human func-
tioning. Interestingly, he was earlier 
than Hippocrates (460-370 B.C.E.), 
who is often considered the ‘father’ of 
more rational and modern medicine. 
Alcmaeon is said to have done a num-
ber of non-human dissections excising 
eyes and noting their connections to the 
brain. One fragment attributed to him 
states that, “All the senses are somehow 
connected to the brain. That is why 
they are incapacitated if it is moved or 
displaced; for it obstructs the passages 
through which the senses work.” It is 
a bit unclear how one’s brain becomes 
“displaced,” though it does not sound 
comfortable. Nonetheless, such work 
led him to conclude that the various 
sensory modalities were unified in 
the brain – this is the binding problem 
again, more or less, specifically in terms 
of, “Where does it all come together?” 
Additionally, Alcmaeon proposed that 
a primary distinction between animals 
and humans was that animals have 
sense perception, but only humans have 
understanding. The interesting part 
here for this paper is that the term used 
for understanding at one point in time 
roughly meant ‘to bring together.’ This 
has led some scholars to propose that 
Alcmaeon was saying that humans can 
bring together the various senses in a 
way that animals cannot. This idea is 
tantalizing, as it suggests again a bind-
ing together of psychological experi-
ence from differing modalities into 
something unified.
It is our second person however, 
Empedocles (roughly 495-435 B.C.E.), 
who provides perhaps the simplest, 
most elegant framing of the binding 
problem I have ever encountered. It 
is sweet, simple, and really gets to the 
point. He states, “One vision is pro-
duced by both [eyes],” or alternatively, 
“One vision of two eyes is born.” In 
fact, when introducing the binding 
problem to students in my classes, I will 
often start with this quote, as it is so 
straightforward and to the point, even 
if, ironically, it was written roughly 
twenty-five hundred years ago.
Epilogue
It seems that the concept of the binding 
problem, something vital for psycho-
logical functioning that is still a very 
hot topic in neuroscience, has some 
very, very deep roots. Every discipline 
of course has its own unique history 
that is ‘bound’ together with the cul-
ture and history of everything else. It is 
humbling, fascinating, frustrating, and 
beautiful, that we can go back thou-
sands of years and see modern ‘new’ 
ideas, current hot topics and the fash-
ionable research of our times, presented 
so long ago, and to see how they are 
‘bound’ to our modern concepts across 
vast swaths of time via the progression 
of intellectual history.
Binding is vital to our 
psychological functioning and 
it is still a very hot topic in 
neuroscience and a variety of 
other areas – so much so that some 
may think that it is a new topic, 
a recent advance, something that 
was not much considered before. 
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